##
## Configuration of the on-demand browser container.
##
## Sourced by /etc/quadlets/seedbox/seedbox-waypipe.sh (as root) and by
## /etc/profile.d/seedbox.sh, so keep it to plain shell assignments.
##
## Every setting uses the ${VAR:-default} form so that an environment variable
## still wins over the file, which makes one-off overrides easy:
##     BROWSER_PODMAN_OPTS=--security-opt=seccomp=unconfined seedbox-browser ...
##
## It is owned by root:root on purpose (see the seedbox Makefile): the shim
## sources it with root privileges, so it must not be writable by the seedbox
## user the browser runs as.
##

# Container image, rebuilt every night by librewolf-build.timer.
BROWSER_IMAGE="${BROWSER_IMAGE:-localhost/librewolf:latest}"

# The browser runs as the unprivileged seedbox user, like the rest of the stack.
# Changing these means rebuilding the image: the Containerfile creates
# /run/user/<uid> (the browser's XDG_RUNTIME_DIR) with matching ownership.
BROWSER_UID="${BROWSER_UID:-10017}"
BROWSER_GID="${BROWSER_GID:-10000}"

# Persistent browser profile: bookmarks, cookies, extension state.
# On the production seedbox, point this at the SSD virtiofs mount instead:
#     BROWSER_PROFILE_DIR=/var/lib/virtiofs/ssd/librewolf
BROWSER_PROFILE_DIR="${BROWSER_PROFILE_DIR:-/var/lib/quadlets/seedbox/librewolf}"

# Where downloads land. On the production seedbox, the import directory the
# *arr stack already watches is the obvious candidate:
#     BROWSER_DOWNLOAD_DIR=/var/lib/virtiofs/hdd/import
BROWSER_DOWNLOAD_DIR="${BROWSER_DOWNLOAD_DIR:-/var/lib/quadlets/seedbox/downloads}"

# Firefox-family browsers are multi-process and need a large /dev/shm.
BROWSER_SHM_SIZE="${BROWSER_SHM_SIZE:-1g}"

# --no-gpu: there is no GPU in this VM, so block wayland-drm and linux-dmabuf
# instead of letting waypipe negotiate them and fail.
#
# These are only added when the client has not passed them already: "waypipe
# ssh" forwards several of its own options to the server side, and a repeated
# flag is a hard error ("cannot be used multiple times").
BROWSER_WAYPIPE_OPTS="${BROWSER_WAYPIPE_OPTS:---no-gpu}"

# Escape hatch for extra podman arguments, e.g. if the browser's own sandbox
# ends up needing a looser seccomp profile:
#     BROWSER_PODMAN_OPTS="--security-opt seccomp=unconfined"
BROWSER_PODMAN_OPTS="${BROWSER_PODMAN_OPTS:-}"